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Abstract
In a distribution channel, where multiple
manufacturers and retailers compete intensively,
manufacturers’ investment decisions on directly
communicating with end consumers are strategic. In this
study, we examined the interactive relationship between
the manufacturers’ management response strategies to
online customer reviews and the channel structure
formed in the online market. We collected data from
Amazon.com, where the manufacturers, instead of the
retailers, decide whether and how to respond to the
customer reviews. The study illustrates the interaction
of channel structure and manufacturers’ management
response strategies to the reviews. On the one hand, if a
manufacturer invests in responding to customer reviews,
more retailers are willing to carry its product. On the
other hand, if more retailers sell a manufacturer’s
product, or if there are more intensive intra-competition
in the retailer channels, the manufacturer is more likely
to invest in management response.

1. Introduction
As marketing becomes more and more customeroriented, manufacturers’ marketing strategy extends to
direct communications with end consumers. For
example, High Ridge Brands, one leading consumer
packaged goods company, is communicating directly
with millions of customers through email, social, mobile,
earned and owned digital channels. This helps the
company to build up a business valued at $415 million
in five years 1 . Directly communicating with end
consumers helps manufacturers understand consumers’
needs and preferences. Consequently, manufacturers
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can keep a high retention rate, acquire new customers
and eventually increase profitability. Moreover, those
manufacturers who maintain strong relationships with
end customers appeal to retailers.
In a distribution channel, where intense competition
exists among multiple manufacturers and retailers,
manufacturers’ investment decisions on direct
communications with end consumers are complicated,
as they interact with the channel structure of the
distribution channel. On the one hand, the return of a
manufacturer’s investment on direct communicating
with end consumers depends on the structure of the
distribution channel. Intuitively, communicating with
end consumers can increase the brand value of its
products, consequently the sales from each retailer
channel. The more retailer channels a manufacturer is
using, the more benefit it can gain by the direct
communication strategy. However, the competition
among the retailers may weaken the total benefit to
some extent. In addition, manufacturers’ direct
communication strategies may cause retailers’ freeriding behaviors to reduce their marketing investments.
As a consequence, the total sales of the distribution
channel do not increase as expected and the
manufacturer receives less benefit from its’ direct
communication strategy. On the other hand, the
manufacturer’s direct communication strategy affects
the retailers’ adoption decisions and consequently
reshape the structure of the distribution channel.
Directly communicating with consumers augments
consumer satisfaction and brand recognition of the
manufacturer’s products and induces more retailers to
deliver the products.
Furthermore, the strategy
represents a commitment by the manufacturer to
reinforce the role of the retailer channels [32], which
consolidates existing retailers’ collaboration willingness.
Nevertheless, increased brand equity may give

1https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2016/06/07/how-

leading-brands-are-winning-the-direct-to-customerconversation/#48bc75a54fbd
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manufacturers more power than retailers [3,32], which
distance the retailer from consumers [8]. It may hurt
retailers’ interests and impede the retailers’ adoption
decision. Besides, as directly communicating with end
consumers requires substantial human and financial
resources, manufacturers need to consider the cost as
well when making their investment decisions. In
summary, there is lack of theoretical understanding of
how manufacturers optimize their direct communication
strategy under different channel structures, and how
their direct communication strategies restructure the
distribution channel.
We use a unique context, Amazon.com, to explore
the relationship between manufacturers’ investment in
communicating with end consumers and channel
structure. In the online marketplace, retailers list
products by different manufacturers in their channels
and independently set retail prices. End consumers share
their purchasing experiences through customer reviews,
which are sorted according to the products but not to the
retailers who sold the products. It’s the manufacturers,
instead of the retailers, to manage whether and how to
respond to customer reviews. In this market,
management response to customer reviews becomes a
critical tactic of directly communicating with end
consumers.
Our study aims to examine the interaction between
the manufacturers’ management response investment
decision and the channel structure formed in the
marketplace. Specifically, we consider two research
questions: (1) How are manufacturers’ management
response strategies affected by the features of the
channel structure? (2) How do manufacturers'
management response strategies restructure the
distribution channel? To address these questions, we
build a theoretical model and empirically examine the
relationship
between
channel
structure
and
manufacturers’ management response investment
decision using a simultaneous equation model. The
empirical results illustrate that the evolution of channel
structure is altered by the customer reviews and
manufacturers’ responding strategies to the reviews.
Specifically, positive customer reviews of a product
allure retailers to sell the product. If the manufacturer
invests in responding to customer reviews, more
retailers are willing to carry its product. Our study also
shows the impact of channel structure on the
manufacturer’s management response strategy. If more
retailers sell a manufacturer’s product, or if there are
more intensive intra-competition in the retailer channels,
the manufacturer is more likely to invest in responding
to customer reviews.
This research fills a substantial gap in the literature
on channel structure and manufacturer’s marketing
strategy of directly communicating with end consumers

by examining the relationship between channel structure
and manufacturers’ management response to customer
reviews. Moreover, it provides practical suggestions for
manufacturers to invest in marketing communication
strategy direct to end consumers under different channel
structures.

2. Literature review
2.1. The relationship between manufacturer’
marketing strategies and channel relationship
Some studies focus on manufacturers’ brand related
marketing strategies to end consumers in a distribution
channel. Davis & Mentzer (2008) suggested that
retailers depend on manufacturers’ brand equity to
access to consumers [8]. Webster (2000) thought that
manufacturers’ brand is a key element in channel
relationship as the brand can increase retailers’ profit,
gives the retailers credibility and protect retailers from
competition from other resellers [32]. Zhang et al. (2017)
showed that marketing strategies to improve consumers’
brand loyalty are channel management strategies as with
the increase of consumers’ brand loyalty, retailers’
dependence on suppliers increases [39]. In the industrial
multi dyadic channel, Dahlquis & Griffith (2014) found
that industrial component suppliers (CS) will make
marketing investment direct to indirect industrial buyers
(IIB) to communicate its product-specific value to IIB
and attract original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to
use the CS’s product [7].
A few studies have found that the effect of
manufacturers’ marketing strategies depends on the
characteristics of the channel structure. Neslin et al.
(1995) suggested that the benefit of manufacturers’
advertising directly to end consumers depends on the
reaction of both retailers and consumers [21]. Pauwels
(2007) showed that the effectiveness of manufacturer
promotions for consumer goods is affected by
competitors’ wholesale price reduction and retailers
pass-through of promotion behaviour [23]. Zhang & Xie
(2012) discovered that when there are multiple
symmetric retailers in the distribution channel,
manufacturers’ national advertising helps to generate
sales of retailers that carry products of its brands, and as
the retailer’s number scales up, it contributes
increasingly to add profits to both the manufacturer and
the retailers in equilibrium [40]. Chutani & Sethi (2018)
have considered both national advertising effort and cooperation advertising effort decision of manufacturer
and found that as the number of retailers in the
distribution channel increase, local advertising effort by
each retailer decreases and national advertising effort by
each manufacturer increases [6].
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Overall, the existing research has studied the
relationship between manufacturers’ marketing
strategies and channel relationship. However, the
research about the relationship between manufacturers’
marketing strategies of directly communicating with
end consumers and channel structure is limited. And the
study about management response and its relationship
with channel structure is rare. Next, we discuss some
studies related to management response to online
customer reviews.

In this paper, we focus on studying the relationship
between management response strategy and channel
structure by modelling the effect of the channel structure
characteristics on management response decision and
the effect of management response decision on retailers’
adoption decision simultaneously. Studying this
relationship will provide further insight into the effect
of channel structure on manufacturers’ direct marketing
strategies to end consumers.

3. Theoretical framework
2.2. Management response to online customer
reviews
Many studies have examined the effect of online
customer review (including rating and text) on product
sales [4,5,10,29,30,38,41] and consumer satisfaction
[9,20].
Specifically,
product
and
consumer
characteristics are used as moderators in studying the
effect of online review [2,11,13]. Moreover, some
studies have examined the effect of online reviews on
channel competition [15]. Existing studies have
recognized the effect of online customer review, and the
management response to online reviews have become an
interest of academics. Most of the studies in this area
focus on the impact of management response on firms’
performance and consumers’ satisfaction.
Some research focuses on studying the impact of
management response on firms’ performance, including
firms’ financial performance and firms’ reputation. Ye
et al. (2008) found that management response to online
customer reviews is likely to influence consumers’
perceived value of the brand and their purchase attention,
and consequently increase product sales in the hotel
industry
[37].
Specifically,
some
important
characteristics of management response, including the
total number of management responses, the length and
response time, have a positive relationship with hotel
financial performance [35,36]. Besides, management
responses can mitigate the effect of negative reviews on
brand or firm evaluations [25,31] and improve firms’
online reputation by increasing hotel ratings [24].
Some other studies focus on the effect of
management response on consumers’ satisfaction and
attitude. Management response is part of firms’
customer relationship management strategies, leading to
more positive consumer attitudes towards the
organization [16,28,33]. Responding to the online
complaints has a positive effect on the company,
including existing consumers’ satisfaction and their
continued loyalty to the company [12,17]. Specifically,
Min et al. (2015) have found that management response
includes empathy or paraphrasing statements for
negative online reviews can even increase the
satisfaction of potential customers [19].

Given that we are modelling manufacturer’s
management response investment decision considering
the structure of the distribution channel, we develop a
theoretical framework to describe the relationship
between manufacturers and their retailers in which
manufacturers’ management response decisions and the
number of their retailers are determined endogenously.
We consider a marketplace in which a few
manufacturers sell their products through multiple
independent retailers. The manufacturers, instead of the
retailers, decide whether to respond to end consumers’
product reviews to maximize their profits considering
the characteristics of the channel structure. The retailers
decide whether to adopt the manufacturers’ products
considering the former’s management response
strategies. The manufacturers’ management response
investment decisions interact with the number of their
retailers dynamically and eventually reach an
equilibrium state. The model is based on following
general assumptions: (1) the manufacturers’ marginal
costs fixed; (2) all retailers pay the same wholesale price
for a manufacturer’s product.
We assume that there are N retailers and M
manufacturers in the market. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume each manufacturer sells one product in the
market. Manufacturers make their management
response decision depend on the channel structure. The
wholesale price of manufacturer j’s product is 𝑊𝑗 , the
marginal cost of manufacturer j’s product is 𝐶𝑗 .
Retailers decide whether to carry manufacturers’
product. The decision function is as follows: if the
retailer i carries manufacturer j’s product, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1 ;
𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 0, otherwise.
Then the number of retailers who adopt
manufacturer j’s product is:
𝑁

𝑛𝑗 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗

(1)

𝑖=1

And the number of products that the retailer i carries
is:
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𝑀

𝑚𝑖 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗

(2)

𝑗=1

Retailer i independently sets product j’s retail price
𝑃𝑖𝑗 , and the sales of manufacturer j’s product is 𝑞𝑖𝑗 .
Retailer i’s profit is as follows:
𝑀

Π𝑖𝑟 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗 )𝑞𝑖𝑗

(3)

4. Hypothesis development
Based on the above theoretical model, we develop
nine hypotheses as shown in Figure 1. Due to the space
limit, we briefly explain the reasoning for the first three
hypotheses.
Manufacturers
management
response decision

－
H5

Retailers rating

𝑗=1

Manufacturer j’s management response strategy is
𝑅𝑗 . we assume the cost of management response strategy
is 𝜂𝑗 𝑅𝑗 , the 𝜂𝑗 depends on the characteristics of a
manufacturer. Then, manufacturer j’s profit is as follows:
= ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗 (𝑊𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗 )𝑞𝑖𝑗 − 𝜂𝑗 𝑅𝑗

(4)

𝑖=1

We model the impact of channel structure on
manufacturers’ management response strategy as
follows:
Manufacturer j optimizes 𝑅𝑗∗ to maximize Π𝑗𝑚 Given
the first order condition 𝜕Π𝑗𝑚 ⁄𝜕 𝑅𝑗 = 0, we have
̃𝑖𝑗 𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑞
𝜂𝑗
𝑛𝑗
=
(5)
𝜕𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗 𝑊𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗
where, 𝑣𝑗 is consumer perceived value of
̃
𝜕𝑞
manufacturer j’s product; 𝑖𝑗 denotes how consumer
𝜕𝑣𝑗

perceived value averagely affects the sales in each
retailer channel; and

𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗

is the marginal impact of

management response strategy on consumer perceived
value. Equation (5) defines how the number of
manufacturer j’s retailers (𝑛𝑗 ) affects its management
response strategy (𝑅𝑗∗ ).
We then model the impact of manufacturers’
management response strategies on the number of
retailers. Retailer i decides to adopt the manufacturer
j’s product (𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1), if and only if its total profit when
adopting the product is larger than that without adopting
the product. When the retailer decides to sell the
product by the manufacturer j, its profits from the other
products decrease due to the substitute effect, ∆𝛱𝑖𝑗 ′ <
0 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑗 ′ . Hence, the necessary and sufficient
condition for the retailer i to carry the manufacturer j’s
product is
𝑀

(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗 )𝑞𝑖𝑗 − ∆Π𝑖𝑗 ′ ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ′ > 0

(6)

𝑗≠𝑗 ′

̃
We define the ∆Π
𝑖𝑗′ as the average of ∆Π𝑖𝑗 ′ , where
𝑗 ≠ 𝑗 ′ . Then, (6) can be approximated as
̃
(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗 )𝑞𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚𝑖 ⋅ ∆Π
(7)
𝑖𝑗′

H2

－H6
＋
H8

Product rating

＋ H3

H1 ＋

Intra-competition

H7 ＋

𝑁

𝛱𝑗𝑚

＋

－
H9

Variance of
reviews

Number of
retailers

H4

－

Figure 1 Hypotheses
Existing literature [12,16,17,33] has shown that
management response will increase consumer’s
perceived value, thus 𝜕𝑣𝑗 ⁄𝜕𝑅𝑗 > 0 . However, the
marginal benefit on perceived value by the
manufacturer’s management response strategy is
decreasing, 𝜕 2 𝑣𝑗 ⁄𝜕𝑅𝑗2 < 0.
We now consider how the manufacturer j adjust its
management response strategy 𝑅𝑗∗ according to the
change of number of its retailers in short run operation.
The right side of equation (5) is fixed in short run, as all
the variables are determined by the manufacturer’s
characteristics. Thus, the left side of equation (5) should
also keep constant, to achieve the optimal management
response strategy. If more retailers join to sell the
product, 𝑛𝑗 increases. Then the value of 𝜕𝑣𝑗 ⁄𝜕𝑅𝑗
should decrease. Given 𝜕 2 𝑣𝑗 ⁄𝜕𝑅𝑗2 < 0 , 𝑅𝑗∗ increases.
The background intuition is that when the increasing
number of retailers 𝑛𝑗 adopt the product, per unit benefit
from management response strategy increases, the
manufacturer is more likely to invest in management
response. Therefore, we generate the following
hypothesis:
H1: As the number of retailers in the channel
increases, the manufacturer’s propensity to invest in
management response.
As we know, the intra-competition exists as retailers’
carry other competing products in the channel, and this
intra-competition will affect the benefit of
manufacturer’s management response strategy. End
consumers are more sensitive to product perceived value
when the competition is more intensive in the retail
channels. Thus,

𝜕
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗

(

𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗

) > 0.

Then with the intensification of intra-competition,
̃
𝜕𝑞
the value of 𝑖𝑗 will increase. Back to equation (5), to
𝜕𝑣𝑗
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maximize the profit, the value of 𝜕𝑣𝑗 ⁄𝜕𝑅𝑗 should
decrease; therefore, R𝑗∗ will increase. In other words,
with the increasing intra-competition in the retailer
channels, the manufacturer should invest in
management response because management response
can build brand differentiation and gain their
competitive advantage among other manufacturers,
consequently improve profit. Thus, we have the
following hypothesis:
H2: The more intensive intra-competition in the
retailer channels, the more likely for the manufacturer
to invest in management response.
As we discussed above, management response can
increase consumer’s perceived value, and a higher
perceived value can result in higher sales. Therefore,
manufacturers’ management response is supposed to
increase retailers’ sales.

𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗

=

𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗

⋅

𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗

> 0 . If

manufacturer j invests in management response, the
retailer i’s sales 𝑞𝑖𝑗 will increase, then the inequality (7)
have a higher probability to hold. Therefore, retailer i
more likely to adopt manufacturer j’s product, that is,
𝐷𝑖𝑗 is more likely to be equal 1. As 𝑛𝑗 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑖𝑗 , the
number of retailers in the channel will increase. We
generate the following hypothesis:
H3: A manufacturer’s management response strategy
will induce more retailers to adopt the product.

5. Empirical analysis
5.1 Data
We use crawling techniques to track 1439 products
with customer reviews from 441 brands daily in Wipe
& Refill category on Amazon.com. We focus on
studying the repeated-purchase products, such as
household supplies, because management response is a
common business practice in household supplies
categories. The competition in the Wipe & Refill
category is intense. Manufacturers have a strong
incentive to build a good relationship with both end
consumers and retailers.
Our data period is from January 2018 to May 2018.
We collect daily data on product characteristics (product
rating, sales rank, etc.), channel structure (the number of
retailers, the number of products a retailer carries, etc.),
retailers’ characteristics (retailer price, retailer rating,
the total number of rating, etc.), online reviews, and
manufacturer’s management response. The online
review data includes review posting data, helpfulness
vote, review rating and review context. Management
response data includes manufacturers’ responding
content, responding date and the corresponding review.
Although there are more than 1400 products in the Wipe

& Refill categories, only 430 products received new
reviews during our data period. Totally, 5505 reviews
and 713 management responses were posted during the
period. As most products did not receive new reviews
every day, we decide to use monthly data for the
empirical study.

5.2. Empirical model
The theoretical model presented in the previous
section suggests that the manufacturers’ management
response decision is a function of the channel structure,
that is, the number of retailers in the channel, intracompetition. Meanwhile, the number of retailers in the
channel is a function of manufacturers’ responding
decision. We are to examine the reciprocal relationship
between manufacturers’ management response decision
and the number of retailers. We estimate a set of two
simultaneous equations to describe how the equilibrium
manufacturers’ management response strategy and the
number of retailers in the channel are determined. The
first equation models manufacturers’ strategic
behaviours and explain the manufacturers’ management
response decision as an outcome of channel structure
(including the number of retailers, intra-competition),
retailers’ credibility level, manufacturers type dummy,
time dummies and product characteristics such as
product rating and variance of the customer review
ratings. The second equation describes the retailers’
adoption behaviours and treats the number of retailers
as an outcome of manufacturers’ management response
strategy, product rating, the variance of the customer
review ratings, sales rank, the intra-competition and
time dummies. Manufacturers’ management response
strategy 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 and the number of retailers
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 are the endogenous dependent variables
in the simultaneous equation model, and other variables
are exogenous variables.
The time dummies in both equations control the time
effect on manufacturers’ management decision and the
number of retailers in the channel. The descriptive
statistics of key variables in the model is in Table1. The
empirical simultaneous equation model is as follows:
(1)𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
+ 𝛽8 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡
(2)𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2 log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 )
+ 𝛿3 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿5 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 + 𝛿7 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
+ 𝛿8 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡
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6. Estimation and result
6.1 Estimation
The simultaneous equations model contains an
endogenous dichotomous variable (management
response decision) and an endogenous continuous
variable (number of retailers in the channel). The two
equations have exclusion restrictions for identification.
The manufacturers’ management response investment
decision equation has two variables excluded in the
channel structure equation— the average rating of
retailers 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 and manufacturer type
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖 . These two variables influence manufacturers’
management response investment decision by affecting
manufacturers’ investment, but without any direct
impact on the number of retailers in the channel.
Similarly, the channel structure equation is identified by
a variable excluded in the manufacturers’ management
response investment equation—the sales rank of the
product log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ) . The benefit of the simultaneous

method is that it captures causality between the two
dependent variables. Because there are both
dichotomous and continuous endogenous dependent
variables in the model, traditional two-stage or threestage least squares estimation which is suitable for both
continuous endogenous dependent variables equations
will lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we use the twostage probit least squares estimation method [18], which
correct the biased standard errors in the second stage of
the estimation. The steps of the estimation approach are
as following: (1) In step 1, the endogenous variables are
fitted using all the exogenous variables. The
dichotomous endogenous variable (management
response decision) is estimated via Probit and the
continuous endogenous variable (the number of retailers
in the channel) is estimated via OLS. (2) In step 2, we
regress management response decision and number of
retailers on the include exogenous variables and
predicted values of endogenous variables from step 1.
(3) In the final step, the outputted standard errors for
each model in the second step are corrected using
variance-covariance matrices.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Model Variables
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒊𝒕
𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒕
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂_𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕
𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕
𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒊𝒕 )

Explanation
The average number retailers of the product i at time t
The possibility for manufacturer of the product i to respond
to customer reviews at time t
The average of the number of other products the product i
retailers carries (within the category) at time t
The average review rating of the product i at time t
The variance of the review rating of the product i
The weighted average of retailer rating of product i at time t
Log transformation of the average sales rank of the product
i at time t

6.2 Result
Table 2 presents the full estimates of the
simultaneous equations model. We first look at the
factors that determine manufacturers’ management
response investment decision. We find that the
coefficient of the number of retailers (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 ) in
the channel is significantly positive, supporting
hypothesis H1. The result indicates that the number of
retailers in the channel is positively related to the
propensity of manufacturers to invest in management
response. We find that the coefficient of
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 in Equation 1 is positive and
significant. This result support H2, that more intense the
intra-competition in the retailer channels is, the more
likely for the manufacturer to invest in responding
customer reviews. These results provide an empirical
evidence for our theoretical finding that a

M
6.75
0.11

SD
6.05
0.32

Min
1
1

Max
28.7
0

37.12

41.54

0

193.7

3.93
1.95
4.87
4.77

0.72
1.53
0.18
1.30

0
0
4
0

5
5
5
8.17

manufacturer’s management response strategy depends
on the structure of the distribution channel, including the
number of retailers in the channel and intra-competition.
Moreover, the coefficient of retailers’ ratings
( 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ), is negative and significant,
suggesting that when the average level of retailers’
credibility is high, manufacturers are less likely to
invest in management response.
Next, we analyze the factors affect the number of
retailers in the channel. The coefficient of
manufacturers’ management response decision (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 )
is positive and significant in Equation 2. This result is
consistent with H3, which support our theoretical
finding that manufacturers’ management response
strategies have a positive impact on retailers’ decision
to adopt the manufacturers’ products. As the 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a
dummy variable in Equation 2, the result indicates that
if a manufacturer invests in responding customer
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reviews, more retailers are willing to carry its product,
and else otherwise. The coefficient for the control
variable, the sales rank of the product ( log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ) ),
which reflect the demand of the product and directly
influence retailers’ adoption decision, is negative and
significant. This result indicates manufacturer’s product
with top rank attracts more retailers to adopt the product.
Moreover, the effect of 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 on the
number of retailers is negative and significant,
suggesting that retailers are willing to carry product with
less intensive competition.
In both equations, the time dummies are
insignificant, suggesting that main effects not changed
over time.
Table 2 estimation results
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡

Model 1(Base Model)
Coef.
Std.
P>t
Err.
0.245***
0.044 0.000
-1.363**
0.497 0.006
0.009**
0.003 0.004
0.468
0.308 0.128
-0.115
0.175 0.511
0.167
0.104 0.108
0.129
0.235 0.582
0.234
0.238 0.325
-0.170
0.382 0.657
2.726
2.413 0.259

𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡
intercept
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
2.211***
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡
0.438
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
-0.397
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
-0.944**
log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 )
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 -0.047***
-0.473
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
-0.904
-0.071
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡
intercept
16.323***
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

0.396
0.437
0.286
0.279
0.007
0.658
0.658
1.049
2.473

0.000
0.316
0.165
0.001
0.000
0.472
0.170
0.946
0.000

7. Robustness check
7.1 Using alternative estimation method
In the main model, we use the two-stage probit least
squares method [18] to estimate the simultaneous
equations model. We now check the robustness of our
findings using an alternative estimation method. We try
to estimate the two equations in the simultaneous system
separately. To estimate the Equation 1, we use the twostage estimator method described in Newey (1987),
which is suitable for probit model with a continuous
endogenous variable [22]. In Equation 1, the variable
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 is a continuous endogenous variable, and
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 is dummy dependent variable. The variable
log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ), which is in Equation 2 but not in Equation

1, is used as the instrument variable. To estimate
Equation 2, we use the estimate method according to
Wooldridge (2010) [34]. In the first step, we regress the
endogenous variable on all the exogenous instruments
via Probit, and then use the predicted value in first step
as the IV in the 2SLS model. In Equation 2, the variable
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 is dummy endogenous variable and
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 is continuous dependent variable. Our
analysis using such estimation methods yields similar
results. However, because the simultaneous interaction
between 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 is not considered in
such methods, the coefficient of 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 which directly
reflect the impact on 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 , is greater than the
coefficient in base model. The results present in Table3.
Table 3 Robustness checks

𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡

Model 2
(Alternative
estimation
method)
Coef.
Std.
Err.
0.244***
0.045
-1.390**
0.513
0.010**
0.003
0.467
0.315
-0.119
0.178
0.166
0.106
0.122
0.241
0.237
0.243
-0.162
0.390

𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡
Unscented𝑖
Natural𝑖
AlcoholFree𝑖
HypoAllergenic𝑖
Sensitive𝑖
intercept
2.874
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
12.911***
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡
0.668*
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
-0.168
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
-0.100***
log(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 )
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 -0.045***
-0.210
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
-0.777
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
-0.573
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡
9.810***
intercept
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

2.492

Model 3
(product features
as control
variables)
Coef.
Std.
Err.
0.270***
0.047
-1.368**
0.533
0.010**
0.003
0.412
0.312
-0.111
0.185
0.191
0.109
0.158
0.245
0.282
0.248
-0.245
0.398
0.387
0.258
-0.433
0.236
0.422
0.318
-0.391
0.324
-0.214
0.285
2.549
2.569

1.709
0.336
0.234
0.253
0.006
0.615
0.616
0.923
2.349

2.341***
0.467
-0.474
-0.797**
-0.046***
-0.474
-0.939
0.183
15.969***

0.373
0.465
0.296
0.274
0.007
0.677
0.676
1.086
2.610

7.2 Using product features as control variables
We report results with the controls for the product
features in Table3. Some specific features of the product
may influence manufacturers’ management response
investment decision. Therefore, we try to use some
product features as control variables to check whether
manufacturers are more likely to respond to products
with some specific features. The robustness check relies
on the primary product features classified by
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Amazon.com, including Unscented, Natural, AlcoholFree, Hypo-Allergenic, Sensitive. We take these five
features as dummy control variables to repeat our
estimation. The results show that coefficients of these
five dummies are insignificant, which indicates
manufacturers will not tend to make a management
response investment decision on a product with specific
features.

8. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we present a theoretical model to
analyze how are manufacturers’ management response
strategies affected by the features of the channel
structure and how do manufacturers' management
response strategies restructure the distribution channel?
And we empirically test the hypotheses developed based
on the theoretical model.
Our results show that channel structure affects
manufacturers’ management response investment
decision. Firstly, As the marginal cost of management
response is constant, the more retailer channels a
manufacturer is using, the more benefit the
manufacturer’s management response strategy will
generate. Therefore, the manufacturer is more likely to
invest in responding to customer reviews. Secondly, the
direct impact of intra-competition on manufacturers’
management response decisions is significantly positive,
showing that the marginal benefit of a manufacturer’s
management response strategy is high when its products
competes intensively with competitors in the retailer
channels. Besides, the average retailers’ rating has
significantly negative impact on manufacturers’
management response investment decision. The high
rating of retailers is a guarantee of the quality of goods
and services, and the marginal benefit of manufacturers’
management response strategies is low when the rating
of retailers is high. Therefore, manufacturers have lower
propensity to respond to the product. Finally, our results
also show that manufacturers’ management response
strategies can attract more retailers to carry the product
and alter the channel structure, as the manufacturer’s
management response strategy can promote the sale of
retailers who carry its product.
Our empirical study also shows some other findings
regarding the control variables. The sales rank of the
product has a significantly negative influence on the
number of retailers. The top sales rank stands for the
high quality of product to some extent and is a guarantee
for the high consumer demand, thus retailers are likely
to adopt the product. Moreover, the intra-competition in
the channel has a negative and significant impact on
retailers’ adoption decision as well. When the intracompetition is more intensive, the profit for retailers

who adopts the manufacturer’s product will decrease,
thus less retailers will adopt the product.
This research contributes to the literature in several
ways. First, we examine the effect of channel structure
on manufacturers’ marketing strategies of directly
communicating with end consumers. Prior research
focuses on the effect of manufacturers’ marketing
strategies direct to consumers on manufacturer
themselves and retailers in the channel [8,26]. Although
a few researchers have examined the effect of channel
structure characteristics on manufacturers’ marketing
strategy [6,23,40], these researchers ignored its
reciprocal relationship with channel structure. Our
results demonstrate that manufacturers’ marketing
strategy of management response interacts with channel
structure. Second, we extend existing research on the
importance of directly communicating with end
consumers on firms’ performance. Prior research has
examined the importance of management response on
product sales [37] and consumer satisfaction [12,17,19].
We extend this research by illustrating the importance
of management response strategy on channel
relationship management.
Our study provides managerial implications. The
empirical findings suggest that when there are many
retailers in a distribution channel, and there is intense
competition among the products carried by the retailers,
the manufacturer should invest in marketing strategies
direct to end consumers. Moreover, retailers can take
advantage of the manufacturers’ strategies direct to end
consumers when they make their product adoption
decision because products which manufacturers invest
in marketing strategies are supposed to have higher
perceived quality.
This study has limitations that further research could
address. First, we examined the manufacturers’
management response decision on repeated-purchased
products on Amazon.com. The manufacturers’
management response behaviour of other types of
product is rare on Amazon.com. If the data are available,
we can compare manufacturers investment decision on
management response in different product types.
Secondly, we focus on manufacturers’ management
response decision. We do not analyze the characteristics
of management response, such as the length of the
management response content, and the corresponding
reviews valence. Such analysis would offer a deeper
understanding of manufacturers’ responding strategies.
Finally, we assume that the marginal costs for
manufacturers are fixed. However, this could affect
manufactures' strategy to respond to customer reviews.
We will relax the assumption in the future study.
In conclusion, our study validates the interactive
impacts between firms’ direct communication strategies
and channel structure. Specifically, it explores the
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complex impacts of the channel structure on
manufacturers’ management response to online reviews
in a multi-channel distribution system. It offers
manufactures guidelines for investment in marketing
strategies direct to end consumers under different
channel structure. It also gives insight into the further
research about direct marketing strategies and channel
relationship management.
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